Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 15, February 2012 by Ciaian, Pavel et al.
FACTOR MARKETS Working Papers present work being conducted within the FACTOR MARKETS 
research project, which analyses and compares the functioning of factor markets for agriculture in the 
member states, candidate countries and the EU as a whole, with a view to stimulating reactions from other 
experts in the field. See the back cover for more information on the project. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with 
which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the Factor Markets (www.factormarkets.eu) 
and CEPS (www.ceps.eu) websites 
ISBN 978-94-6138-154-5 
© Copyright 2011, Pavel Ciaian, d’Artis Kancs, Jo Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck and Liesbet Vranken 
FACTOR MARKETS Coordination: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, 
Belgium Tel: +32 (0)2 229 3911 • Fax: +32 (0)2 229 4151 • E-mail: info@factormarkets.eu • web: www.factormarkets.eu 
 
 
Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural 
Land in EU Member States 
and Candidate Countries 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we describe the regulations governing the rental markets for agricultural land in selected 
EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on various kinds of regulations and 
institutions connected with the land rental market, including price, tenancy duration, quantity and 
other regulations, as well as transaction costs. The diverse government regulations on price 
restrictions and tenancy duration are analysed, along with the social norms observed for rental 
payments and contracts. The paper also examines the type and registration of contracts, the contract 
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1. Introduction 
All agricultural markets are subject to institutional regulations that – in one way or another – 
affect the functioning of these markets and this is no different for the agricultural land 
market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the regulations concerning the rental market for 
agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. In combination with 
Ciaian et al. (2012a), which describes the regulations for the sales market, this paper will be 
the basis for future analysis in the Factor Markets project. 
In 2004 and 2007, ten and two countries respectively acceded to the EU in its enlargement 
with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Until 1989, the agricultural sector in these 
countries was regulated by the state and dominated by large-scale state farms that cultivated 
state-owned land or by collective farms that typically used land that was still in private 
ownership on paper but over which the landowners did not have any decision rights as to its 
use or allocation. There were only two exceptions, Poland and the former Yugoslavian 
countries, where collectivisation largely failed, such that a considerable share of agricultural 
land was already being used by individual farmers during the communist era (Lerman, 2001). 
After 1989, land reforms were introduced and land was restituted to the former owners or 
distributed among the workers at the state farms (Lerman et al., 2004). In addition, farm 
restructuring resulted in the introduction of hard budget constraints. The implementation of 
farm restructuring and land reform processes was difficult (Swinnen et al., 2006), and in 
some countries land reforms are still not yet fully completed (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009; 
Swinnen and Vranken, 2010). Since the history of collective land use has a long lasting 
impact on the current functioning of the land market and the region has undergone such 
radical changes in the past 10 years, we have opted to make a distinction in this discussion 
between the regulations in old member states (OMS) and those in the new member states 
(NMS).1
                                                        
* Pavel Ciaian and d’Artis Kancs are working at the European Commission (DG Joint Research 
Centre); Johan F.M. Swinnen is a Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Director of the LICOS Centre 
for Institutions and Economic Performance at KU Leuven; Kristine Van Herck is a PhD Student at the 
LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance at KU Leuven; Liesbet Vranken is an 
Assistant Professor at the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, at KU Leuven. 
The paper draws importantly on background information and comments provided by Eleni Kaditi 
(CEPS). The authors are solely responsible for the content of the paper. The views expressed are purely 
those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the 
European Commission. 
1 The selected OMS in this study are Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the UK. The NMS are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The selection of these countries is based 
on data availability.  
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Along with selected EU member states (OMS and NMS), we also consider the situation in the 
agricultural land markets of two candidate countries: the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey.  
In general, the sale of agricultural land is considered superior to land rental because 1) land 
sales transfer full ownership rights to the new users; 2) sales are more likely to increase 
access to credit, since owned land can be used as collateral; and 3) sales provide optimal 
incentives for investment by entailing the permanent security of rights (Binswanger et al., 
1993). In most EU member states, however, the rental market seems to be more important 
than the sales market and a large share of the agricultural area is rented, although there are 
substantial variations in the shares of rented land (Figure 1). In the OMS, the share of rented 
land ranges between 18% in Ireland and 74% in France, while in the NMS it ranges from 17% 
in Romania to 89% in Slovakia (Table 1). 
Figure 1. Share of rented land as a % of the total utilised agricultural area (UAA) (in 2007) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 1. Share of rented land as a % of the total UAA (2007) 
Old member states 
Belgium 67 
Germany 62 
Greece 32 
Finland 34 
France  74 
Ireland 18 
Italy  28 
Netherlands 25 
Spain  27 
Sweden 39 
UK 32 
New member states 
Bulgaria 79 
Czech Republic 83 
Estonia 50 
Hungary 56 
Latvia 27 
Lithuania 48 
Poland 20 
Romania 17 
Slovakia 89 
Source: Eurostat. 
There are several reasons for the high degree of importance of the rental market and the 
differences among member states.  
First, the differences in the importance of the rental market are based on historical grounds. 
For example, variations in inheritance laws (e.g. adoption of the Napoleonic Code with 
respect to inheritance in France and other Western European countries) have led to assorted 
farm structures (e.g. in France more fragmented ownership, because each child receives an 
equal amount of land, while in the UK for instance, the first son has traditionally inherited 
the farm estate). This has affected the farm structure and the share of rented land. In the 
NMS, the share of rented land is also based on historical factors (see Box 1).  
Second, imperfections in input, product, credit and insurance markets affect the functioning 
of land markets (Vranken and Swinnen, 2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Van Herck et al., 
2011). Credit and capital markets play a crucial role, especially for land sales in the NMS.  
Third, transaction costs can be high in the case of land sales. The transaction costs include 
the traditional costs, such as notary fees and registration costs. But in the NMS, individuals 
who want to sell their agricultural land are also confronted by additional transaction costs, 
such as high withdrawal costs, insecure property rights and imperfect competition on the 
land market (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006; see also Ciaian et al., 2012a). 
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In such an environment, land rental may have certain advantages over land sales 
transactions, since they 
• allow more flexible adjustments in the land used with relatively low transaction costs; 
and 
• have a limited cost, which allows the farmer to invest more in other productive assets. 
Yet this does not mean that rental markets work perfectly in the EU. There are still problems 
with 1) a lack of investment incentives owing to a lack of long-term security (e.g. Romania); 
2) overregulation, such as the stipulation of minimum durations, which prevents flexibility 
(e.g. Belgium) (Swinnen, 2002); and 3) access to credit, since rental contracts cannot be used 
as collateral.  
We do not further discuss the recent evolutions in the rental market for agricultural land in 
great detail in this paper, since these are covered in Ciaian et al. (2012b). Still, we have 
provided these limited data on regional differences in the rental market to enable the reader 
to put the findings on the institutional regulations discussed in this paper into perspective.  
There are five types of rental market regulations and institutions discussed in the remainder 
of the paper: 1) price regulations, 2) tenancy duration regulations, 3) quantity regulations, 4) 
transaction costs and 5) other relevant regulations. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix give an 
overview of the most important regulations and institutions affecting the rental market for 
agricultural land in the OMS and the NMS respectively. For our analysis, this study draws 
heavily upon earlier work by Ciaian et al. (2010), Swinnen and Vranken (2009, 2010) and a 
questionnaire sent to the different partners in the Factor Markets project. 
Box 1. Historical background on differences in the share of rented land in the NMS 
In some NMS, corporate farms use the large majority of all agricultural land, almost all of 
which is rented. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more than 70% of the total agricultural 
land area is used by corporate farms (Figure 2). Also in Hungary, Estonia and Bulgaria, 
corporate farms still use around half of all agricultural land. A large share of agricultural land is 
continues to be rented to the large-scale successor organisations of the former cooperatives and 
state farms (Vranken et al., 2011). Indeed, there is a striking correlation between the prevalence 
of land rental at the country level and the proportion of corporate farms in total land use 
(Swinnen et al., 2006) (Figure 3). 
This can be attributed to the land reform process that was implemented at the start of 
transition. Land was restituted to former owners, among whom the majority are not (or are no 
longer) active in agriculture. They may be retired or living in urban areas and are more likely to 
rent it out, particularly to large-scale corporate farms, for several reasons. First, because of 
limited information about the sales price and the expected increase in land prices upon 
accession to the EU, most of these new landowners have been unwilling to sell their newly 
acquired assets and have preferred to rent out the land instead. Second, since identifying 
potential tenants involves search and negotiation costs, it has been easier for the new 
landowners to rent out their land to corporate farms, which were the historical users of the land 
(Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). Third, the corporate management has been closely involved in 
the land reform process, and their search and negotiating costs in identifying and contracting 
with these new landowners have been significantly lower than the costs faced by newly 
emerging structures (particularly family farms and de novo companies). In combination, these 
factors have resulted in a higher demand for rented land by corporate farms than by family 
farms and an increased supply of rented land to corporate farms than to family farms. 
Consequently, restitution has contributed to a consolidation of the large-scale farming 
structures (collective and state farms in the past, now corporate farms) through the land rental 
market. 
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Figure 2. Share of land used by corporate farms in the NMS (% of UAA, 2007) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 3. Correlation between the share of land rented and the land used by corporate 
farms (2007) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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2. Price regulations 
In this section, we distinguish between government regulations on rental prices (e.g. 
minimum/maximum price) and social norms in the rental market (e.g. payment at the end of 
the season, payment in kind or in cash).  
2.1 Government regulations on price restrictions 
In several EU member states, governments impose price restrictions on the rental markets 
for agricultural land. These price restrictions may take the form of a maximum or a minimum 
rental price. For example in Belgium and the Netherlands, there is a maximum rent. In 
France, there is a combination of a minimum and a maximum rent. In the other OMS in our 
sample (Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK), there are no 
rental price restrictions. Likewise in the NMS, there are no price restrictions on agricultural 
land, but in some countries the transaction costs for land rental strongly affect rental prices 
(see section 5.2). 
In France, rental prices are regulated at the level of the département or NUTS 3 level. Each 
département sets a price index (indice des fermages). For non-built land, the index is 
calculated as the weighted sum of the average gross farm income in the département, the 
average gross farm income in France and the average gross farm income for some specific 
types of production in France, all averaged over the 5 previous years to reduce year-on-year 
volatility in farm incomes. In addition, it may also include the prices for some specific 
commodities. The weights applied are specific to the département and the index is re-
evaluated each year.2 For land with buildings, the index is based on the type, use and age of 
the buildings. The index is then used to set a minimum and maximum price. But even within 
the department, there may be variations in the minimum and maximum price depending on 
the destined use of the land (e.g. for specific cultivation, such as permanent crops). 
Furthermore, the rental price can be increased in cases of a transferable contract (bail 
cessible) (see section 6.1).  
In Belgium, the tenant and the landowner reach a mutual agreement on the rental price. 
Nevertheless, the rental price cannot be higher than the maximum price determined by the 
tenancy law. For contracts of 9 years (the most commonly used type of contract), the 
maximum price for agricultural plots and buildings is equal to the cadastral income3 of the 
plot or building multiplied by a certain ‘tenancy coefficient’, which depends on the 
agricultural region and the province. The tenancy coefficients are determined by a 
commission composed of members of the regional governments and the agricultural 
organisations and are based on the evolution of the agricultural profitability in the region 
during the previous two periods of 3 years. The coefficients are different for plots and 
buildings and are adjusted every 3 years. Note that in the case of a rental contract with a 
longer duration, the maximum price is increased by 36% (contracts for a minimum of 18 
years) or 50% (contracts for a minimum of 25 years), since these contracts provide more 
security for the continuity of the activities of the tenant (Van Eyken, 2003). Overall official 
rents are very low, however, and in most of the cases the maximum price is paid. Moreover, 
there is evidence of additional payments ‘in an envelope’ (see Box 2).  
                                                        
2 Note that up to 1995, the index was calculated in similar way as in Belgium, and it was based on the 
average regional and national crop yields.  
3 The cadastral income is an index created in 1975 that represents the net rental income that a 
landowner could gain based on the characteristics of the plot (soil quality and plot location – e.g. on 
slope). 
RENTAL MARKET REGULATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND IN EU AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES | 7 
 
Box 2. Rental payments ‘in an envelope’ in the land rental market in Belgium 
Depending on the agricultural value of the land (soil quality) and the eagerness of the tenant to 
cultivate the plot (e.g. the plot allows better access to the plots s/he already cultivates), an 
additional payment ‘in an envelope’ is made. The rigidity of the tenancy market (a minimum 
duration of 9 years for a rental contract) enhances the use of these additional payments: when a 
plot with a good location is rented out, neighbouring farmers are prepared to pay a higher price 
than the official maximum price because if they are not able to rent the plot, it will take at least 
9 years before the plot becomes available again.  
Also in the Netherlands, the government established regional rent ceilings and allowed only 
very modest rent adjustments each year. Ironically, although aimed at protecting tenants and 
offering them tenure security for many years, these measures had the opposite result 
(Swinnen, 2002). To circumvent the strict regulation, a so-called ‘grey’ rental sector evolved 
(similar to the situation in Belgium) and farmers concluded informal contracts with 
landowners in which prices were sometimes on average 50% higher than the officially 
registered rents. In 1995, the grey rents accounted for 25% of the total rented area in the 
Netherlands (Hoek and Luijt, 1999). Hence, to stop the growth of the informal market, more 
liberal forms of rental contracts were introduced. Since 2007, rental agreements for less than 
6 years have no longer been subject to these regulations, although contracts with a longer 
duration are still subject the price regulations. 
2.2 Social norms related to price regulations 
In addition to legal price regulations, there are social norms for rental payments in all 
countries, for example, with respect to the type of payment (in cash or in kind) or the timing 
of the payment (at the end or the beginning of the season).  
While in most OMS rental payments are made in cash, rental payments in kind are more 
common in the NMS. For example, in Poland, more than 20% of the contracts involving 
private rentals in 2005 were paid in kind (goods and services) rather than in cash. This was 
notably the case in regions with a high degree of land fragmentation and where agriculture is 
only an additional source of income. In Slovakia, only half of the farms reported paying rent 
exclusively in cash, while the other half of the farmers reported paying part of the rent in cash 
and part in kind. Similarly in Turkey, sharecropping contracts are frequently used in the 
rental markets. These contracts usually include the following division of the harvest: one-
third for the landowner and two-thirds for the tenant. But there can be large variations in the 
division since it depends on the agreement between the landowner and the tenant.  
In the NMS, it is mainly corporate farms that pay in kind. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that corporate farms reduce payments by paying in kind instead of in cash and that 
these in-kind payments by corporate farms are less transparent. The in-kind payments often 
depend on yields, which are difficult for landowners to control and may result in lower 
effective rent payments, with a negative impact on the welfare of the landowners (Vranken et 
al., 2011). In several countries, experts indicate that less productive corporate farms often do 
not pay rents as contractually agreed. For instance, in Bulgaria, Swinnen et al. (2006) found 
that only a small share of the payments (33%) made by the cooperatives are in cash. For the 
remaining transactions, rental payments are in kind or as a combination of an in-kind and 
cash payment, or are not paid at all.  
The timing of the payment differs among countries and even within countries there are 
substantial variations depending on what is agreed in the contract.  
Traditionally, payments take place at the end of the season in Belgium (December), France 
(Saint Michel or 29 September), Finland and Sweden (December). 
In other countries, such as Greece and Italy, the tenant pays the rent in advance at the 
beginning of the season, which is not affected by the economic outcome of the year. Still, 
there are no regulations on this subject in either of these two countries. 
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In Germany, there is large variation across regions concerning when the rent is paid. For 
example in Saxony, it depends on the landowner. If the land is rented from a private person, 
the rent is usually paid once a year after the season. If the land is rented from the government 
land agency, the land rent has to be paid every third month in advance. In Weser-Ems it 
depends on the size of the land and the amount of money to be paid. If one has more than 10 
ha or one has to pay more than a couple of thousand euros, it is paid on a monthly basis or a 
couple of times a year. Smaller amounts are normally paid once a year after the season. In 
Bavaria, the land rent is paid once a year. There is no uniformity in relation to when the land 
rent is paid, as some pay in advance and others after the cultivation period. 
In the NMS, rents are traditionally paid at the end of the season. For example in Hungary, 
rental payments are made subsequent to the period to which it pertains. For years in which 
the crop yield remains below two-thirds of the average owing to a natural disaster or some 
other extraordinary event, the tenant is entitled to request a reduction or consolidation of the 
rental payment. The tenant should communicate this request to the landowner prior to 
harvesting and the landowner is not allowed to demand additional payments in the 
subsequent years in order to recover reduced or consolidated rental payments. 
Also in Poland, tenants have the right to ask for a reduction in the rental price in the case of 
force majeure or in the event that farm revenues are much lower than in other years.  
3. Tenancy duration regulations 
The duration of rental contracts for agricultural land gives a first indication of the rental 
market flexibility of farmers to adjust their production to changes in the external 
environment. Hence, other things being equal, long-term rental contracts for agricultural 
land will allow less adjustment to external changes than short-term rental contracts. On the 
other hand, short-term contracts offer tenants less security, which reduces investment 
incentives for farmers.  
The two key determinants of rental contract duration are governmental regulations (e.g. in 
Belgium and France, a minimum of 9 years; in the Netherlands, a minimum of 6 years; and 
Spain, a minimum of 5 years) and social norms (e.g. in Greece and several NMS, contracts 
are usually seasonal). Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) even the 
renewal/inheritance of rental contracts is regulated (see also section 6.1.). 
3.1 Government regulations on tenancy duration 
In Belgium, there are several types of tenancy contracts, in general long-term contracts. First, 
there is a ‘traditional’ tenancy contract with a duration of at least 9 years. If the landowner 
and the tenant make a different arrangement and sign a tenancy contract of, for example 5 
years, or if there is no duration specified by the contract, the contract is automatically 
prolonged to 9 years. Second, it is possible to have a contract of 18 years or longer.4Third, 
there is also a ‘career contract’, of which the duration is equal to the duration of the expected 
career of the farmer. The law establishes that the duration of the contract is equal to the 
difference between the age of the farmer at the start of the contract and the age of 65. The 
minimum duration of the contract is determined by law to be 27 years. For example, if at the 
start of the contract the tenant farmer is 25 years old, the duration of the contract will be 40 
years; but if s/he is 35 years old, the duration of the contract will only be equal to 30 years. 
Thus, a farmer who is older than 38 is no longer eligible for a career contract. Finally, there 
are also very long-term contracts, such as recht van opstal and erfpacht. Recht van opstal 
implies that a farmer has the property right to have some buildings and crops on the plot of a 
third person. Such a property right can be determined for a maximum period of 50 years and 
                                                        
4 In the case of such long-term contracts (for 18 years, but also for ‘career contracts’), the landowner 
can increase the maximum price, determined by law for a contract duration of 9 years, by 50% for 
plots and by 25% for buildings (see section 2.1). 
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needs to be confirmed by a notary. Erfpacht is similar to recht van opstal, but the duration of 
the contract differs: it should be at least 27 years and up to a maximum of 99 years. 
Contracts of 9 and 18 years are automatically prolonged by successive periods of 9 years, 
likewise when the initial contract specifies a longer duration, unless the landowner gives an 
official termination notice at least a year in advance. Unlike the above-mentioned contracts of 
9 and 18 years, a career contract ends automatically when the tenant turns 65 (no 
termination notice is required). If the landowner nonetheless lets the tenant remain in 
occupation, the contract is prolonged each year by an extra year.  
In recent years, experts have observed an increase in the number of seasonal contracts and 
informal contracts between pensioners and young farmers. This can be related to 1) the 
rigidity of rental contracts (the minimum duration of 9 years), 2) low maximum rental prices, 
and 3) the introduction of single farm support (where seasonal or informal contracts exist, 
the support is received by the owner of the plot and not by the tenant). Therefore, pensioners 
often prefer using a seasonal or informal contract instead of an official tenancy contract.5 
In Finland, the standard land lease contract is a short-term contract with a fixed duration 
and a fixed cash lease payment per year. About 40% of all lease contracts have a duration of 5 
years. Contracts longer than 10 years are prohibited by law. 
In France, the terms of the rental contracts are defined by law through the Statut du 
fermage. The original law of 1945 has been modified several times (1960–62, 1975 and 1984). 
Generally, the rental regulation has always tried to protect the farmer tenant. The following 
regulations apply to all rented land except for plots of less than 1 ha (0.5 ha if there are 
several landlords for one plot). 
Rental contracts for agricultural land are very rarely short term in France. Theoretically, 
there may be short-term contracts; yet owing to tax incentives (reductions) for landowners, 
they usually have a duration of at least 9 years. Similar to the situation in Belgium, there are 
three types of contracts. The baux ruraux are for 9 years, the baux de long terme are for 18 
years and the baux de carrière, i.e. over the tenant’s career, are concluded for 25 years. 
Landowners are given incentives to conclude long-term contracts, as they can receive per-
hectare aid from the government, which cannot exceed the total sum of €8,000 per 
landowner; moreover, the tax on their revenues from rental contracts longer than 9 years is 
reduced by 15%.  
During the contract term, the landlord does not have the right to terminate the contract and 
rent the land out to another tenant. In fact, the landowners only have the possibility to 
terminate the contract in order to sell the land. In such cases, the current tenant nonetheless 
benefits from a pre-emptive right to purchase the land (with the possibility to have the price 
reduced through the intervention of the French land agency, Sociétés d’ Aménagement 
Foncier et d’ Etablissement Rural (SAFER); see also section 6.2). At the end of the term, 
contracts are automatically renewed, but then the landlord has the possibility to withdraw 
the land only if s/he (or the landlord’s heirs) farms the land him or herself. Furthermore, 
contracts are inheritable (and in some cases transferrable) (see section 6.1). 
In the Netherlands, the tenure law introduced in 1958 heavily regulated lease contracts with 
the goal of strengthening the tenant's position. Rental agreements usually had very long 
durations of at least 12 years for farms and 6 years for land. A contract was automatically 
extended for 6 more years at the end of each term, as long as none of the parties cancelled it. 
                                                        
5 Another reason they prefer such contracts is speculation about a change of the zoning regulations. If 
the zoning regulations change and the landowner wants to sell the plot, the tenancy legislation 
determines that s/he has to pay the tenant a compensatory payment and the tenant has the pre-
emptive right to purchase the land. In cases of a seasonal tenancy or an informal contract, this is not 
the case. 
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Nevertheless, in combination with low maximum rental prices, this strict regulation, which 
strongly favours the tenants, resulted in the continuous meltdown of the rental sector and 
growth of the grey market. Therefore, as noted earlier, since September 2007 rental 
agreements for less than 6 years have not been subject to any of these constraints. Contracts 
of more than 6 years, however, are still subject to rent controls by the grondkamers (see 
section 5.1). 
In Spain, the minimum duration of rental contracts is 5 years.  
In Bulgaria, there are two types of officially accepted rental contracts. The first is the arenda 
contract, which has a minimum length of 4 years and for which the rental term can be 
extended up to 50 years. Arenda contracts need to be certified by a notary and registered at 
the Land Commission. Furthermore, if a landowner is selling a plot of land that s/he is 
renting out under an arenda contract, the tenant has a pre-emptive right to purchase the 
tenanted land. At the same time, the obligatory notarisation and registration increases the 
transaction costs. It is often argued that arenda contracts under the Land Lease Law are too 
expensive and therefore tenants are less keen to use them. At the same time, foreigners who 
participate in the land rental market typically rely on arenda contracts. The second type of 
rental agreement is the naem contract, which is mostly used for short-term renting (typically 
one crop year). Naem contracts are regulated by the Law for Obligations and Contracts – 
which provides a more general framework; but as this type of rental agreement does not 
establish any real rights, it is impossible to use the rented land as collateral. Naem contracts 
are written and signed every year and are not notarised or registered. Land plots owned by 
the authorities and included in the state land fund are typically rented out under name 
contracts.  
3.2 Social norms related to tenancy duration 
In Germany, the usual form of rental contract is written with a fixed price and limited 
duration. Nevertheless, there are still oral contracts and contracts of unlimited duration. 
When a contract with a limited duration ends and there are no other arrangements, the 
contract will change to a contract with an unlimited duration, which can be cancelled from 
year to year.  
The average duration of rental contracts varies significantly between regions. The average 
duration in Saxony and Weser-Ems is longer than in Bavaria. In Saxony, the average 
duration of rental contracts is 11.5 years and there are variations of between 7 and 18 years, 
with the long-term contracts linked to investment credit. In Weser-Ems, the average duration 
of a rental contract is 7 years with variations from 5 to 10 years. The longest contracts are in 
grassland areas or in livestock-intensive farming areas. In livestock-intensive areas, farmers 
need long-term contracts. In Bavaria, the average duration of rental contracts is 6 years. The 
duration of rental contracts for arable land and grassland are the same. Even if the average 
duration of rental contracts is 6 years, there are many contracts for only a year and others are 
for 9 years. In Bavaria and Weser-Ems, contracts are normally renewed without an invitation 
to tender.  
In Greece, most rental contracts are seasonal contracts or (although less often used) for a 
duration of 4 years. In general, long-term contracts are used very seldom. 
In Italy, the average duration of rental contracts is heterogeneous across types of crop 
production and regions. For arable crops, it ranges from 2 to 5 years, while rental contracts 
for fruit crops vary from 5 to 10 years but can also go up to 20 years.  
In the UK, the tenancy regulation differs across regions. In England and Wales, the 
Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995 (ATA) made a radical departure from the preceding 
legislation dealing with agricultural tenancies. The ATA allows greater flexibility for 
landowners and tenants to draw up tenancy agreements to suit their particular 
circumstances. The ATA applies to England and Wales but it does not apply to Scotland or 
Northern Ireland. The Regulatory Reform (Agricultural Tenancies) (England and Wales) 
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Order 2006 amended the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 and the ATA 1995. These reforms 
were intended to 1) encourage diversification by tenant farmers, 2) maintain and improve the 
viability of tenant farmers, 3) allow the restructuring of holdings without jeopardising 
valuable rights, 4) improve flexibility in the tenanted sector, and 5) maintain a balance 
between landlord and tenant interests. 
The ATA created a new form of agricultural tenure, known as the farm business tenancy 
(FBT). For an FBT to be created, the land must be used, in part at least, for the purpose of an 
‘agricultural business’. If the land is not used for an agricultural business, then the Act is 
unlikely to apply and the tenure may come under part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 
1954.  
The length of the term is entirely flexible: longer term leases are more likely to encourage 
tenants to invest capital in the business while smaller parcels of land are better suited to 
shorter terms.  
An FBT for a term of not more than 2 years terminates automatically on the expiry date. A 
fixed term of more than 2 years will only terminate once a valid ‘notice to quit’ has been 
served. The 2006 Regulatory Reform Order now means that landlords and tenants can agree 
whatever notice period they wish, providing the notice is given at least 12 months in advance. 
This means that landlords and tenants can agree, for example, on a 3-year notice period, 
where the notice to quit could be served anytime between 36 and 12 months prior to the 
expiry date. If no notice is served, then the tenancy will continue from year to year until a 
valid notice is served.  
In Scotland there are now four forms of agricultural leases permitted under the 2003 Act:  
• First, it is still possible to grant a new ‘traditional’ agricultural tenancy under the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991.  
• Second, there is a grazing or mowing lease for not more than 364 days. Failure to 
ensure the land is vacated at the end of each grazing period means it becomes a 5-year, 
short limited duration tenancy (SLDT).  
• Third, SLDTs are an agricultural lease for a term of not more than 5 years and are 
aimed at validating cropping lets (potatoes, turnips, etc.). If the lease is for a period of 
less than 5 years and the tenant remains in occupation (with the consent of the 
landlord) the lease will default to 5 years. Should the same happen at the end of the 5-
year period, the lease will default to a limited duration tenancy (LDT), with a term of a 
further 15 years. Successive leases of the same land to the same person are 
accumulative. Tenants who occupy land under an SLDT are not allowed to diversify nor 
are they able to exercise the pre-emptive right to buy their tenanted land.  
• Fourth, LDTs were introduced as the standard form of tenancy. These contracts have a 
minimum period of 15 years but can be longer when agreed upon. Termination of LDTs 
at the end of their term is by a minimum of 12 and a maximum of 24 month’s written 
notice. The landlord must serve two notices on the tenant: one 24-36 months prior to 
the effective date and one 12-24 months prior to the effective date (at least 90 days 
apart). If the lease is not terminated by notice at its agreed termination date it will 
continue for a further, initial 3-year period. If no notice is served terminating the lease, 
a second 3-year period will follow, which if not terminated will be followed by a further 
15-year term. LDTs can be assigned with consent from the landlord. LDTs can also be 
sublet if expressly permitted in the lease, or without express permission if the 
subletting is ancillary to an approved diversification scheme. An LDT may be 
bequeathed as with an SLDT under the 1991 Act provisions relating to bequest. A 
tenant with a limited duration tenancy is not entitled to the right to buy but is allowed 
to diversify and harvest trees s/he planted (subject to landlord consent). 
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In Northern Ireland, most of the rented area is leased through the conacre system, which is 
unique to Northern Ireland (and Ireland), whereby land is let on a seasonal basis (nominally 
for 11 months or 364 days) without entering into a long-term commitment. Owing to the use 
of conacre rental agreements, farm businesses may have a number of plots of land but usually 
within 5 miles of a core farmstead. 
Generally, there are no government regulations on the tenancy duration in the NMS. Overall, 
we find that while until a few years ago rental contracts still had a very limited duration, there 
is evidence that currently contracts tend to be longer. Still, in some of the countries that more 
recently acceded to the EU, such as Bulgaria and Romania, renting mainly occurs on an 
annual basis. Long-term rents are still rather scarce, which creates uncertainty for the land 
user.  
In Slovakia, contracts with a duration of between 5 and 10 years dominate, followed by 5-year 
contracts (15%). Before EU accession, contracts tended to be shorter – up to 5 years. There 
are important differences in contract length, however, depending on the tenant type. 
Unregistered family farms typically rent land for shorter periods while registered family 
farms and particularly large-scale corporations rent for longer periods and as such lock in 
land (Swinnen et al., 2006). After accession, contracts became longer to allow farms to use 
European funds, such as those for rural development (but not direct payments). Renting land 
for at least 5 years is one of the requirements imposed by European funds for Slovakia. This 
motivates farmers to sign contracts with a longer duration, up to 10 years (Swinnen and 
Vranken, 2009). 
In Poland, there has also been a significant rise in the number of long-term contracts 
involving private land in recent years (Table 2). Compared with the 1990s, when around 50% 
of rental contracts were for up to 5 years, there has been a substantial decrease in short-term 
transactions. At the same time, the number of undefined or hereditary tenancies has also 
fallen sharply. These latter forms of rental transactions have been used especially in regions 
with a great deal of land fragmentation and income coming mainly from non-agricultural 
sources.  
Table 2. Duration of rental contracts in 2000 and 2005 (% of monitored transactions), 
Poland 
 Up to 2 years 2-5 years 5-10 years 10 and more years Undefined 
2000 8.2 25.1 42 4.2 20.5 
2005 4.9 24.2 58.3 7.8 4.8 
Source: IERiGŻ surveys from (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009). 
In Poland, public land is rented out for a period of 10 years with an option to prolong it. In 
justified cases, longer contracts can be signed but they cannot exceed 30 years. 
According to the IDEMA survey,6 just after EU accession (2005), 52% of landowners in the 
Czech Republic had contracts for a definite period, while 42% of them had contracts for an 
indefinite period. Landowners who noted that they rent out land for a definite period had 
contracts for an average length of 10.8 years. Around 5% of the landowners indicated that 
they did not know the contract length. These are mostly likely absentee landowners who 
received a plot of land during the land reform process and allow a large-scale successor farm 
of the collective or state farm to continue cultivating their plot without caring very much 
about the contract terms. 
In Hungary, tenancy contracts had an average duration of 8 years in 2005 according to 
survey data (Kapronczai, 2005). At the same time, there were differences depending on the 
                                                        
6 IDEMA refers to the FP6 research project, “Impact of Decoupling and Modulation in the Enlarged 
Union: A sectoral and farm level assessment project”. 
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type of tenant. Private farms tended to have tenancy contracts of a shorter duration (7 years) 
than corporate farms (9 years). Very short contract terms (less than 5 years) are rare, even 
among private farmers, among whom less than 10% have short-term rental contracts. 
Contracts with a duration of more than 15 years are negligible among private farmers as well 
as corporate farms. In fact, the Hungarian legislation stipulates that the contract cannot have 
a duration of more than 20 years. 
In Estonia, survey results show that among the farms that participated in the survey, 13% had 
a rental contract for a term of 1 to 3 years, 67% for a term of 4 to 6 years and 7% for a term of 
over 10 years.7 Enterprises with a rental contract for an unlimited duration made up 6%.  
4. Quantity regulations 
In most countries, rental markets are free and unrestricted in relation to regulations on the 
quantity of land rented. In general, there are no constraints on the amount of land that is 
transacted (except for Hungary) and transactions do not need to be approved by a 
government agency (except in Germany and the Netherlands – see section 5.1).  
Unlike for the sales market for agricultural land, there are no specific restrictions with 
respect to foreigners in rental markets in the NMS; foreigners (natural persons and legal 
entities) have the same rights and obligations as domestic investors.  
Also in Turkey, foreigners (natural persons and legal entities) can freely engage in rental 
contracts. Only in the FYROM are there restrictions for foreigners in the land rental market. 
In principle, foreigners (natural persons) cannot rent state-owned agricultural land. But they 
can rent agricultural land from other parties when they receive approval by the ministry of 
justice and ministry of agriculture. Legal entities, on the other hand, can freely engage in 
rental contracts.  
In Hungary, there are restrictions on the amount of land that one can own or rent (maximum 
300 ha).  
5. Transaction costs 
There are different transaction costs that affect agricultural rental markets. In this section, 
we discuss the type and registration of contracts, (legal) contract enforcement mechanisms 
and market imperfections that especially characterise the rental market for agricultural land 
in the NMS.  
5.1 Type and registration of contracts 
In most countries, there is generally the possibility to choose between a written and an oral 
contract. Yet, in almost all countries written contracts are increasingly important. For 
example, in Finland written contracts have become more and more popular as they have been 
supported by the government and the Farmers’ Federation. The Farmers’ Federation also 
provides a platform for rental contracts. This platform has become very popular in recent 
years.  
Unlike for the sales market, there is no obligation to register a land rental contract in most 
countries. Only in Germany, the Netherlands and Hungary is registration of the rental 
contract obligatory and the transaction needs to be approved by the responsible legal 
institutions. In other countries, registration can be done on a voluntary base (e.g. France, 
Ireland and Italy). 
                                                        
7 As reported in a “Land Markets” country report (unpublished) prepared for the CEPS book by 
Swinnen and Vranken (2009). 
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In Germany, generally all rental contracts should be registered in the land register (Möller et 
al., 2010).8 Procedures for the registration of transactions for renting agricultural land and 
specific measures that can be applied in cases of non-compliance with the law are stipulated 
in the Law on the Rent of Agricultural Land (public law). The application of the land rent law 
is comparable to the law concerning land sales (see Vranken et al., 2011a). Every transaction 
on the rental market has to be reported to the responsible office – the Genehmigungsbehörde 
– which is also responsible for the approval of agricultural land sales. Similar to land sales, 
there is a fixed minimum size (defined in each federal state) above which the obligation 
applies. The Genehmigungsbehörde can refuse to approve the transaction during the first 
month after they receive information about it. The reasons for refusing to approve the 
transaction are the same as in the case of land sales, such as the existence of pre-emptive 
rights on the plot, an inefficient allocation of agricultural land or a rental price significantly 
higher or lower than the value of the given plot. 
In the Netherlands, rental contracts need to be registered at special rental courts – the 
grondkamers – from which contract approval must be sought. For contracts with a duration 
longer than 6 years, the contract must be approved by the grondkamer, which checks 
whether the maximum rental price is respected. For contracts with a duration shorter than 6 
years, the grondkamer only needs to approve the contract and does not intervene in the 
determination of the rental price (mutually agreed by the tenant and landowner).  
In Hungary, all contracts should be written, and if the size of the contracted land exceeds 1 
ha, regardless of the number of plots, the contract should be registered at the land title office.  
In Sweden, both formal (written) contracts and informal contracts are used for land rental. 
The former are always used for larger transactions.  
In France, rental contracts may be written or oral; where they are written they may be simply 
set out on a normal paper and signed by both parties. But to be considered officially ‘valid’ 
(especially in the event of a court dispute), the contracts must be declared and registered at a 
tax revenue office (Bureau des Hypothèques, part of the ministry of finance). If the 
contracting parties want to have more secure terms, they may have their written contract 
registered with a notary. In any case, all contracts for which the duration is more than 12 
years must be signed at a notary office.  
In Spain, the existing legislation encourages written contracts, but most contracts are oral. In 
Greece, rental agreements are either oral or written9 (private informal contracts), but usually 
there is no official contract ratified by a legal authority. In general, contracts should not be 
registered unless they are official contracts.  
In all Italian regions, most of rental contracts are written and registered without a notary but 
with the assistance of farmer associations. This is because registration is needed to benefit 
from subsidies. Written contracts signed with the assistance of farmer associations are more 
often used because they are classified as official contracts. Oral contracts are stipulated 
especially among members of the same family. 
In Ireland, there is no requirement to register a rental contract. In the past, most contracts 
were concluded under the conacre system. The term ‘conacre’ originates in the 19th century 
and was used to designate a system under which land was lent not for a number of years, but 
for a single season, usually a year. For the most part, these contracts were not registered. In 
recent years, these types of unregistered contracts have been disappearing because some 
farms may require so-called ‘spreadlands’ for manure under the Nitrates Directive and 
because of increased participation in the Rural Environmental Protection Scheme. Stamp 
duty applies to land rental contracts, at a rate of 1% of the price in the rental contract. 
                                                        
8 The usual form of rental contract is written with a fixed price and limited duration, although oral 
contracts and those of unlimited duration still exist. 
9 According to local land experts, the share of written contracts is very low in Greece and is estimated 
to be less than a third of all rental contracts in Greece.  
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In Bulgaria, the long-term arenda contract needs to be certified by a notary and registered at 
the Land Commission according to the Land Lease Law.10 This results in higher tenure 
security for both the tenant and the landowner. The short-term name contracts are also 
written, but they need to be re-signed every year and are not notarised or registered (as this is 
costly and not required).  
In Estonia, survey results showed that among the farms that responded to a postal survey, 
13% had an oral contract and 87% had a written contract. None of these contracts were 
registered with a notary.11 
Also in Slovakia, written contracts are the most common type of rental contract and 
according to a VUEPP survey conducted in 2006, 97% of all surveyed farms had written 
contracts (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009). 
In Romania, rental contracts are submitted to the local councils, which would give the 
possibility of centralising data on them. But the ministry of agriculture has not initiated any 
work in this respect, and there are no official data on land rental available at the national 
level. The size of the land lease phenomenon is reflected only in the agricultural census (in 
the farm structure surveys) or in the data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). 
5.2 Contract enforcement 
In most countries, legal contract enforcement involves a costly and lengthy procedure. First, 
there are administrative costs. Second, if an expert opinion is required there are costs for an 
authorised expert. Third, in some countries like Germany, court action also requires that 
both parties need to have a legal adviser, which is also costly.  
Yet in other countries, tenancy disputes are dealt with by a small claims court, which 
provides an inexpensive, fast and easy way for citizens to resolve disputes without the need to 
employ a legal adviser. For example, in Belgium this small claims court – the vredegerecht – 
only deals with claims under €1,860. Since one does not need to have a legal adviser, the cost 
is limited to an administrative fee of €35. 
In the NMS, where a large share of agricultural land is rented by corporate farms, landowners 
usually have only limited bargaining power, in combination with high withdrawal costs, 
uncertain property rights and poor options for legal enforcement. In addition, the market is 
characterised by important credit and capital market constraints (Vranken and Swinnen, 
2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006, 2009; Van Hercket al., 2011). Evidence of these high 
transaction costs is discussed in Box 3.  
Box 3. Large differences between Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
Several studies document that land markets in the NMS, even in the most advanced countries, 
are characterised by the existence of substantial transaction costs in rural land markets, 
hindering land exchanges (Dale and Baldwin, 2000; Lerman et al., 2004). Transaction costs 
include those related to bargaining costs, the enforcement of withdrawal rights, asymmetric 
information and unclear boundaries. Uncertainty and high costs in the identification of land 
property rights may lead to soaring transaction costs and constraints on land transactions.  
There is some evidence that corporate farms reduce payments by paying in kind instead of 
in cash, since these in-kind payments by corporate farms are less transparent. As noted 
earlier, the in-kind payments frequently depend on yields, which are difficult for 
landowners to control, and result in lower effective rent payments. Table 3 provides 
evidence on the differences in rental prices paid by family farms and legal entities. 
                                                        
10 Land Lease Law, State Gazette 82, 27 September 1996; amended SG No. 35/1999. 
11As reported in a “Land Markets” country report (unpublished) prepared for the CEPS book by 
Swinnen and Vranken (2009). 
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Table 3. Rental prices for agricultural land paid by family farms and legal entities (€/ha) 
  1997  2001  2005 
Czech Republic       
Individual farms (€/ha)  16  23  35 
Corporate farms (€/ha)  9  17  30 
Price gap in € (PIF‐PCF)  7  6  5 
Price gap in % (PIF‐PCF)/ PCF  73  37  15 
Slovakia       
Individual farms (€/ha)  –  18  24 
Corporate farms (€/ha)  –  6  17 
Price gap in € (PIF‐PCF)  –  13  7 
Price gap in % (PIF‐PCF)/ PCF  –  229  45 
 
Sources: FADN for Slovakia and VUZE for the Czech Republic. 
6. Other regulations 
In addition to the price, tenancy duration and quantity regulations, other regulations may be 
stipulated in a contract and affect the functioning of the rental markets. In this section, we 
discuss differences in regulations on the inheritability of contracts and the pre-emptive right 
of tenants. 
6.1 Inheritability of contracts 
In some countries, rental contracts are inheritable, which means that when the current 
tenant retires or deceases, a successor will take over the contract.  
This is the case for example in France, where contracts are inheritable if the tenant retires or 
deceases and a landlord is only free to decide on a new tenant when there is no successor. 
Since 2006, a ‘transferrable’ contract has come into use, the bail cessible. The main idea 
behind this type of contract is that exiting tenants who have no successor in their family can 
now choose to transfer the contract to whom they want. Tenants and landlords can both 
agree for their contract to be converted into a bail cessible. In compensation for the reduced 
opportunities, the landlord can ask for a price increase when the contract is converted: the 
maximum rental price is increased by 50% at most. In addition, transferrable contracts have 
a duration of 18 years (and not 9 years, which is the most common duration for a rental 
contract in France – see section 3). Furthermore, they are not subject to compulsory renewal.  
Contracts are transferrable in Hungary: a tenant may stop the rental contract when his/her 
health or living conditions deteriorate and the tenant is not able to perform the contractual 
obligations. In such situations, the tenant may appoint someone to take over the contract 
under the same conditions.  
In Belgium, rental contracts are inheritable when a tenant retires and s/he has a spouse or 
children (or both) who want to take over the tenancy contract. Moreover, when they inform 
the landowner in writing of the transfer, the contract may be renewed, which implies that a 
new contract period of 9 years (minimum) starts. If the tenant dies without a surviving 
spouse or children (or both) who want to take over the farm, the landowner can end the 
contract during the first year after the tenant has deceased. If there are legal heirs (direct 
relatives and others) who want to take over the farm, they should inform the landowner in 
writing to secure contract renewal and only in some very specific cases (e.g. own use) can the 
landowner refuse the renewal.  
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In the UK, where tenancy regulations differ between regions, England and Wales have a 
‘livelihood test’. This test is part of the eligibility criteria for statutory succession to a tenancy, 
as prescribed by the 1986 Act. Previously, this test obliged successors to have earned their 
principal source of livelihood from agricultural work on the holding for 5 out of the last 7 
years. Successors could risk their right to succession if they have drawn significant income 
from non-agricultural activities on the farm, inhibiting diversification activities. 
Nevertheless, if the landlord agrees, it is possible to adjust the livelihood test and allow 
successors to earn income from on-farm diversification.12 The changes do not impact the 
successor’s right to succeed to a tenancy where the principal source of income is from 
agricultural activities on the holding.  
In Poland, rental contracts are also inheritable.  
6.2 Pre-emptive rights of tenants 
In several countries, there are pre-emptive rights for the tenants cultivating the land. Such 
regulation exists, for example, in Italy, France and Belgium. This pre-emptive right has been 
recently introduced in Scotland.  
In Scotland, the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 introduced changes for tenants 
holding traditional leases under the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991. One of the 
changes is that tenants have a pre-emptive right to buy the land that they lease. A tenant can 
register an interest in acquiring the land comprised in his/her lease contract and if the 
landowner intends to transfer the land, the landowner must notify the tenant and must not 
enter sale negotiations until s/he has dealt with the tenant’s interest.  
In Belgium, tenants also have a pre-emptive right to buy the land. When a landowner offers a 
plot for sale, the notary will have to inform the tenant in writing about the sale of the plot. In 
this letter, the notary will include all information on the sale, including the price, such that it 
can be considered a sales offer to the tenant. The tenant can either accept or refuse the offer. 
If the tenant refuses, the landowner is not allowed to sell the plot at a lower price than that 
specified in the letter.  
In Hungary, tenants likewise have a primary, pre-emptive right to purchase land when it is 
for sale. In particular, the pre-emptive right to buy land is first to be made available for 
tenants renting the land for at least 3 years. If a legal entity is renting the land, the 
shareholder of the company or member of the cooperative has this pre-emptive right.13 
In Bulgaria, the pre-emptive right depends on the type of rental contract. In particular, it 
only holds for arenda contracts, which need to be registered and are for a longer time period 
(see above).  
Likewise in Poland, tenants have a pre-emptive right to buy the land, while in Romania, it has 
been abolished since 2005. 
                                                        
12 In this case, the agreement by the landlord should be in writing and it must have been given on or 
after 19 October 2006.  
13 A secondary pre-emptive right exists for the neighbour living next to the location, with priority given 
to a registered family farmer followed by a registered primary producer (legal entities). Finally, the 
state has a pre-emptive right to purchase the land according to Law CXVI of 2001 on the National 
Land Fund. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Overview of the institutional and regulatory framework with respect to renting agricultural land in the OMS 
 Price regulations 
Tenancy duration 
regulations Quantity regulations 
Transaction 
costs Other 
OMS 
Min. 
price Max. price Min. Max. 
Average 
tenancy 
duration 
Limitation 
on the 
amount of 
land 
rented 
Restriction 
related to 
the leasing 
of land 
Restriction 
on renting 
land to EU 
natural and 
legal 
persons 
Registration 
in the 
cadastre or 
land registry 
Pre-
emptive 
right 
Austria     √       
√ (contract 
may be 
subject to 
regional 
authority 
approval)   √ (but optional)   
Belgium   
√ (regional 
variation; 
determined based 
on the cadastral 
value of the land) 
√ (9 or 
27 
years) 
√ (50 or 
99 years) 9 years       
√ (in registry 
office, not in 
cadastre) √ 
Finland       
√ (15 
years) 5-6 years     
(except Aland 
county)     
France √ 
√ (regional 
variation; 
determined based 
on a price index 
obtained from 
information on the 
regional and 
national income 
from the 
agricultural sector) 
√ (9 
years) 
√ (career 
contract; 
at least 25 
years) 9  years   
√ (may be 
requested in 
the contract 
e.g. the 
environmental 
restrictions)   
√ (only in cases 
of long-term 
contracts) 
√ (also for 
neighbouring 
farmers) 
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Table A1. cont’d 
 
Price 
regulations Tenancy duration regulations Quantity regulations 
Transaction 
costs Other 
OMS 
Min. 
price 
Max. 
price Min. Max. 
Average 
tenancy 
duration 
Limitatio
n on the 
amount of 
land 
rented 
Restriction 
related to the 
leasing of land 
Restriction 
on renting 
land to EU 
natural and 
legal persons 
Registration 
in the 
cadastre or 
land 
registry 
Pre-
emptive 
right 
Germany         
6-11.5 years 
(6 Bavaria, 7 
Weser Ems, 
11.5 Saxony)   
√ (contract may be 
subject to regional 
authority approval)   √  
√ 
(optional 
in 
contract) 
Ireland         11 months       
√ (but 
optional)   
Italy     
√ (usually 
1 year)   
2-10 years (2-
5 for arable 
crops, 5-10 
for fruit 
crops)       
√ (but 
optional) √ 
Netherlands   
√ 
(depends 
on the 
duration 
of the 
contract) 
√ (6 years 
until 
2007, now 
a shorter 
duration 
is 
possible)   10 years   
√ (contracts with a 
minimum duration 
of 6 years may be 
subject to regional 
authority approval)   
√ (in cases of 
contracts with 
a minimum 
duration of 6 
years) √ 
Sweden         1 year       √    
UK      
√ (in 
Scotland: 
annual 
contracts 
for 
grazing or 
mowing)   
regional 
variations: 
Northern 
Ireland – 
conacre (11 
months); 
other regions 
– 5 years   
√ (may be 
requested in the 
contract e.g. 
environmental 
restrictions)   √  
√ (in 
Scotland) 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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Table A2. Overview of the institutional and regulatory framework with respect to renting agricultural land in the NMS 
  Price regulations Tenancy duration regulations  Quantity regulations 
Transaction 
costs Other 
NMS Min. price 
Max. 
price Min. Max. 
Average 
tenancy 
duration 
Limitation on 
the amount 
of land 
rented 
Restriction 
related to 
the leasing 
of land 
Restriction 
on renting 
land to EU 
natural and 
legal persons 
Registration 
in the 
cadastre or 
land registry 
Pre-
emptive 
right 
Bulgaria     
√ (naem, 
annual 
contract; 
arenda, 4 
years) 
√ 
(arenda, 
50 years) 1 year 
√ (maximum 
for one person: 
600 ha)     
√ (only for 
arenda 
contracts is 
registration 
required) 
√ (in the 
case of 
arenda 
contracts) 
Czech 
Republic 
√ (if there is 
no agreement 
between the 
farmer and 
tenant)       
1 to 5 or 10 
years         
√ (co-
owners; 
tenant)  
Estonia       
√ (99 in 
the case 
of 
usufruct)         
√ (registration 
in the land 
register is 
required)   
Hungary       
√ (20 
years) 
8 years 
(individual 
farms 5-9 
years, farm 
enterprises 
10 years) 
√ (maximum 
300 ha for 
private and 
legal persons, 
2,500 ha for 
farm 
organisations)     
√ (for land 
exceeding 1 ha, 
registration at 
the land title 
office is 
required) 
√ (tenant 
who leases 
the land 
for at least 
3 years) 
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Table A2. cont’d 
 Price regulations Tenancy duration regulations Quantity regulations 
Transaction 
costs Other 
NMS Min. price  
Max. 
price Min. Max. 
Average 
tenancy 
duration 
Limitation 
on the 
amount of 
land 
rented 
Restriction 
related to 
the leasing 
of land 
Restriction 
on renting 
land to EU 
natural and 
legal 
persons 
Registration 
in the 
cadastre or 
land 
registry 
Pre-
emptive 
right 
Lithuania       
√ (up to 
99 years 
for 
private 
land, up 
to 25 
years for 
state 
land)     
√ (may be 
requested in 
the contract 
e.g. 
environmental 
restrictions)   
√ (for long-
term 
contracts - 
more than 10 
years; for 
state-owned 
land, 
registration in 
the state 
register) 
√ (first co-
owner and 
then user 
of the land, 
if s/he has 
occupied 
the land for 
at least 1 
year) 
Poland 
√ (for public 
land based on 
the price of 
wheat)     
√ (30 
years) 10 years         
√ (tenant 
after 3 
years of 
tenancy) 
Romania         1 year       
√ (for long-
term 
contracts, 
registration in 
the cadastre is 
required)   
Slovakia  
√ (1.5% of the 
administrative 
price of land 
for state-
owned land)   
√ 
(minimum 
5 years 
required 
for 
European 
funds)   5-10 years       
√ (contracts 
of more than 
5 years must 
be registered 
in the 
cadastre) 
√ (co-
owners) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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